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TERM OF THE COURT
ice agency. The children were not permitted to testify. In the
original divorce proceeding the family court commissioner was
dismissed by the trial judge without it appearing in the record
that he had been given an opportunity to carry out his duties
as set forth in chapter 247.11 This case presented a situation
where adequate safeguards for the protection of the children's
interest were lacking, thus requiring the appointment of a
guardian ad litem.
Under circumstances where the trial court in its discretion
is satisfied that representation of the children and information
concerning their future welfare is adequate, section 247.045
would seem to be satisfied without appointment of a guardian
ad litem. The hard and fast rule laid down by the court requir-
ing the appointment of a guardian ad litem where custody of
minors is at issue is overly stringent in the absence of a clear
showing of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge.
DONALD J. WALL
INSURANCE
I. BAD FAITH-EXCESS LIABILITY
Perhaps the most significant decision rendered by the Wis-
consin Supreme Court in the field of insurance law during the
past term was Alt v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.'
This decision provided additional answers and guidelines to
insurance litigators who are constantly faced with the difficult
problems of excess liability for the bad faith handling of settle-
ment negotiations.
The narrow question addressed by the court in Alt was, in
the words of the court, "whether, in a claim against an in-
surance company for liability for failure to settle a claim, there
35. It is the court commissioner's duty to represent the public interest in the
maintenance of the marriage relationship and to advise the judge "as to the merits of
the case and the rights and interests of the parties" in cases where reconciliation efforts
fail.
1. 71 Wis. 2d 340, 237 N.W.2d 706 (1976). A major portion of the Litigation Law
section meeting at the 1976 Wisconsin Bar Association Convention was devoted to the
topic of the current status of the bad-faith excess-liability issue in Wisconsin, with
counsel from both sides in the Alt case giving presentations on the question.
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must be evidence of an unequivocal and legally binding offer
before a jury issue can be raised in respect to an insurer's lack
of good faith."' 2 The court also dealt with the similar question
of whether a demand by the insured or the insured's attorney
that settlement be affected within the policy limits is a condi-
tion precedent to finding bad faith on the part of the insurer.
Alt arose from a 1969 accident in which an automobile
driven by the insured struck Alt, a six year old pedestrian,
causing severe brain damage, motor disability, loss of sight in
one eye and substantial medical expenses. The insured had an
automobile liability insurance policy with $50,000 of coverage.
Counsel for the minor plaintiff and his father alleged that
on one occasion prior to the commencement of the automobile
negligence action, and on a second occasion several months
before trial, offers to settle the case for the $50,000 policy limits
had been tendered to the insurer, but that these offers had
yielded no response and had never been communicated to the
insured. The insurer disputed the fact that these offers had
ever been made. An offer of judgment for the policy limits
tendered immediately prior to trial was rejected by the plain-
tiffs due to its tardiness and the expense already undertaken
in preparation for trial.
At trial the jury awarded the plaintiff $279,478.30 in dam-
ages over the policy limits and a judgment for this excess was
then taken against the insured. As is common in bad faith
excess liability cases, the insured assigned her bad faith cause
of action against the insurer to the plaintiffs.
The minor plaintiff, by her guardian ad litem, and her fa-
ther brought an action against the insurer alleging bad faith in
the handling of the settlement negotiations in the automobile
negligence case. While maintaining its position that no offers
had ever been made by plaintiffs, the insurer moved for sum-
mary judgment on the grounds that even if offers had been
made as alleged, they were not "legally binding" offers since
the guardian ad litem did not join in the offers. The absence
of a legally binding offer, it was argued, would preclude a find-
ing of bad faith as a matter of law.
The trial court granted the insurer's motion, agreeing that
a legally binding offer is necessary before bad faith can be
found. The court further held that the failure of the insured to
2. 71 Wis. 2d at 342, 237 N.W.2d at 708.
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demand settlement within the policy limits precluded a finding
of bad faith on the part of the insurer.
On appeal the supreme court reversed, holding that the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on the
above legal conclusions, and remanded the case for trial, mak-
ing it clear that the factual questions in regard to the alleged
settlement negotiations had not been foreclosed.
The court rejected the insurer's primary argument that bad
faith liability can only be imposed where a claimant makes a
legally binding offer. A review of the prior Wisconsin cases,
including Baker v. Northwestern National Casualty Co.3 and
Hilker v. Western Automobile Insurance Co.,' led the court to
the conclusion that the insurer "has an affirmative duty to
seize whatever reasonable opportunity may present itself to
protect its insured from excess liability."5 Applying this duty
broadly to the question presented in Alt, the court prescribed
the following guidelines for insurers in the conduct of settle-
ment negotiations:
It is obvious... that what we speak of when referring to
bad faith is the breach of a known fiduciary duty. This carries
with it the duty to act on behalf of the insured and to exercise
the same standard of care that the insurance company would
exercise were it exercising ordinary diligence in respect to its
own business. Since that is the accepted standard, an insur-
ance company, in which is vested the exclusive control of the
management of a case, breaches its duty when it has the
opportunity to settle an excess liability case within policy
limits and it fails to do so. Only if the overtures towards
settlement appear, as were said in Baker v. Northwestern
National Casualty Co. (1965), 26 Wis. 2d 306, 313, 132
N.W.2d 493 (Baker II) to be "jocular or frivolous," may an
insurance company ignore them and even then it does so at
its peril.6
The court rejected the insurer's contention that the alleged
offer by the minor plaintiff unaccompanied by the approval of
his guardian ad litem was per se "jocular or frivolous" within
3. 22 Wis. 2d 77, 125 N.W.2d 370 (1963).
4. 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257, 235 N.W. 413 (1931).
5. 71 Wis. 2d at 350, 237 N:W.2d at 713.
6. Id. at 348, 237 N.W.2d at 712. The court quoted with favor from Rova Farms
Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495 (1965), the
leading bad-faith excess-liability case, in support of its holding.
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the meaning of Baker v. Northwestern National Casualty Co.7
The court pointed out that an insurance company becomes
bound to a settlement contract if conditions subsequent-such
as guardian ad litem approval-occur.8 In any case, however,
the absence of such approval would not justify the insurance
company's failure to take seriously a reasonable settlement
offer.
In order to avoid breaching its duty to exercise good faith
in the investigation and adjustment of claims against its in-
sured, the court stated:
We hold. . . that in all cases involving a probable over-
age, an insurance carrier must be circumspect in respect to
all settlement overtures which are not patently frivolous,
whether they be legally binding offers or not, at least in situa-
tions where it would be apparent to a reasonable insurer that
excess liability was probable and liability almost certain.'
The second issue dealt with by the court was whether the
insured must make a demand for a settlement within the policy
limits before the insurer's duty to settle arises. Quickly dis-
missing the question, the court stated that the lack of demand
to settle by the insured was only inconclusive evidence of good
faith.
The court concluded by holding that although the action
against an insurer for breach of its duty to protect its insured
from excess liability is a negligence action, the plaintiff must
assume the middle burden of proof and prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the insurer's duty to its insured has
been breached.
In another bad faith action, the supreme court faced, for the
second time, Howard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Liability Insurance Co.'0 Howard involved an action for dam-
ages resulting from the alleged negligence and bad faith of the
defendant insurer in the investigation, settlement negotiations
and defense of claims arising out of a 1968 automobile accident.
At trial in the automobile negligence case, the insured incurred
more than $100,000 of liability in excess of the policy limits. At
7. 26 Wis. 2d 306, 313, 132 N.W.2d 493, 497 (1965).
8. Carey v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 41 Wis. 2d 107, 163 N.W.2d 200 (1968).
9. 71 Wis. 2d at 353, 237 N.W.2d at 714.
10. 70 Wis. 2d 985, 236 N.W.2d 643 (1975). The first appeal appears at 60 Wis. 2d
224, 208 N.W.2d 442 (1973).
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various times prior to trial, the insurer rejected settlement of-
fers within policy limits.
On two subsequent occasions shortly before trial, the defen-
dant insurer made formal offers to permit judgment to be taken
against it for the policy limits plus costs. However, the injured
plaintiff had long since withdrawn its offer to settle for the
policy limits."
The defendant insurer appealed from the excess liability
judgment and the denial of its motions after verdict. It argued,
inter alia, that an insurer's offer of judgment pursuant to sec-
tion 269.02 of the Wisconsin Statutes 2 should, as a matter of
law, preclude a finding of bad faith. Dismissing the insurer's
argument, the court emphasized that the insurer's view of the
law "would render an insurer's prior conduct without
consequence." 3 The court, therefore, held that such settlement
offers, although relevant, would not, as a matter of law pre-
11. Just prior to the automobile negligence trial, the plaintiff therein had raised
its previously rejected demand by requiring State Farm to pay its policy limits of
$10,000 and the insured to contribute an equal sum. In the Howard appeal, the defen-
dant insurer argued that its liability should not exceed the policy limits since the
insured failed to mitigate her damages by not attempting to raise the $10,000 necessary
to consummate the settlement. The court held that the insurer waived its mitigation
defense by failing to amend its pleadings to reflect its reliance on the mitigation
defense, and, in any case, that there was no evidence to sustain the defendant's claim
that the insured failed to make a reasonable effort to mitigate damages.
12. Wis. STAT. § 269.02(1) (1969) provided:
(1) After issue is joined but before the trial the defendant may serve upon
the plaintiff a written offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the
sum, or property, or to the effect therein specified, with costs. If the plaintiff
accepts the offer and serves notice thereof in writing, before trial and within 10
days, he may file the offer, with proof of service of the notice of acceptance, and
the clerk must thereupon enter judgment accordingly, provided the summons
and complaint have been filed. If notice of acceptance is not given, the offer
cannot be given as evidence nor mentioned on the trial. If the offer of judgment
is not accepted and the plaintiff fails to recover a more favorable judgment, he
shall not recover costs but defendant shall recover costs to be computed on the
demand of the complaint.
(2) After issue is joined but before trial the defendant may serve upon the
plaintiff a written offer that if he fails in his defense the damages be assessed
at a specified sum. If the plaintiff accepts the offer and serves notice thereof in
writing before trial, either party may file proof of service of the offer and accept-
ance and the damages will be assessed accordingly. If notice of acceptance is
not given the offer cannot be given as evidence nor mentioned on the trial. If
the offer is not accepted and if damages assessed in favor of the plaintiff do not
exceed the damages offered, neither party shall recover costs.
(3) Subs. (1) and (2) shall apply to offers which may be made by any party
to any other party who demands a judgment or set-off against the offering party.
13. 70 Wis. 2d at 995, 236 N.W.2d at 647.
1977]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
clude a finding of bad faith. It reasoned:
A contrary holding would deprive the insured of the law's
protection in the case where it is most needed-the one with
unquestioned liability and damages far in excess of policy
limits. The insurer could be encouraged to gamble with the
insured's money in the hope of saving some of its own. When
it becomes apparent that the gamble has failed and that the
case will be tried, the insurer could avoid liability for the
excess simply by offering its policy limits in judgment. Such
is not the law.'"
The court's holding, in light of its subsequent opinion in Alt
v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 15 is hardly remarka-
ble. Through Howard and Alt, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
has reemphasized to insurers that their duty to the insured
encompasses more than a duty to pay benefits under the policy.
The conduct of settlement negotiations in the wake of these
decisions will undoubtedly reflect a deepened concern with pro-
tecting the insured in the earliest stages from excess liability.
II. CREATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACT
In Security Insurance Co. v. Department of Industry, Labor
and Human Relations,'" the court examined the role which the
doctrine of estoppel plays in the creation of an insurance con-
tract. The Security Insurance case arose out of an October 22,
1968 accident in which an employee of the Town of Woodville
was injured in the course of his employment, thus entitling him
to worker's compensation benefits. After a series of proceed-
ings, the Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations
(DILHR) found that during the period in which the injury
occurred, both Threshermen's Mutual Insurance Company and
Security Insurance Company of Hartford had policies of
worker's compensation insurance in effect covering the Town
of Woodville. The department's finding was affirmed by the
Dane County Circuit Court.
Security had insured the Town of Woodville during the pe-
riod from December 12, 1966 through December 12, 1967, but
declined to renew its coverage. It sent notices to that effect to
the DILHR, the Wisconsin compensation rating bureau and
14. Id., 236 N.W.2d at 648.
15. 71 Wis. 2d 340, 237 N.W.2d 706 (1975).
16. 69 Wis. 2d 746, 233 N.W.2d 386 (1975).
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the Town of Woodville. Thereafter, Woodville obtained
insurance from Threshermen's for the period of December 12,
1967 to December 12, 1968. The report of insurance, required
to be filed pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes section 205.08(5),
was sent to the Wisconsin compensation rating bureau.
Meanwhile, an agent of Security prevailed upon the com-
pany to issue a policy covering Woodville for the period from
December 12, 1967 to December 12, 1968 under the apparent
belief that additional insurance business might be forthcom-
ing. Security filed its notice of insurance coverage under the
new policy with the rating bureau, as had Threshermen's.
Upon receipt the bureau sent a letter to Woodville inquiring
whether the double coverage was inadvertent. This letter was
never answered.
Security's agent was subsequently informed by Woodville's
town clerk of the town's decision to purchase insurance from
Threshermen's rather than Security. Security's agent re-
sponded by returning the policy to the home office of Security.
In response to inquiries regarding coverage for the injured em-
ployee in 1968, Security recognized the problem and sent a
notice of cancellation to the town and the DILHR.
The tardiness of Security's notice of cancellation under
Wisconsin Statutes section 102.31(1)(a) prompted the trial
court to find coverage by Security for one half of the injured
employee's benefits, together with Threshermen's. In its analy-
sis of the case, the trial court also found that the injured em-
ployee had attained an insured status independent of the insur-
ance contract by virtue of the filings with the rating bureau and
the DILHR.
On Security's appeal of the DILHR's finding and the circuit
court's affirmance, the DILHR contended that the activities of
Security in filing reports of insurance effectuated the creation
of an insurance policy so that cancellation pursuant to section
102.31 (1)(a) was necessary to terminate coverage. In support
of its position the Department cited a Connecticut case,
Piscitello v. Boscarello,17 for the rule that "[t]he declarations
of coverage made in the report are a representation that the
insurer is estopped to deny.""8
The supreme court found that the second policy issued by
17. 113 Conn. 128, 154 A. 168 (1931).
18. 69 Wis. 2d at 751, 233 N.W.2d at 389.
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Security never ripened into a contract since the town's decision
to insure with Threshermen's and to reject the policy proferred
by Security's agent demonstrated the lack of mutual assent
essential to the formation of any contract. 9
The court declined to apply the Piscitello rule to the facts
presented since the only valid basis underlying the estoppel in
the Connecticut case was that court's implied purpose of
providing worker's compensation coverage to injured employ-
ees.2 In Security Insurance, however, it was undisputed that
full coverage would be available to the injured employee under
Threshermen's policy and the only issue was whether Secu-
rity's aborted policy issuance should render it responsible for
one half of the benefits paid. Having distinguished the facts of
the case at bar, the court held that a compensation insurer
would be estopped from denying representations in its filings
under section 205.08(5) only where the employee would be left
without worker's compensation coverage, and conversely,
where full coverage was available to the employee, an insurer
who erroneously reports insurance coverage would not be es-
topped from denying it. The new estoppel rule was adopted by
the court in spite of its statement that "[c]ontracts of insur-
ance are never created by estoppel. ' '21
It remains to be seen what insurer activities pursuant to
section 205.08(5) will be sufficient to create an estoppel. It is
also unclear whether the court entirely rejected the trial court's
suggestion that "the existence of insurance as an independent
(of contract) insured status of the worker . . . [arises] as a
19. The court cited Knox County Feed and Hatchery v. Ivers, 130 Ind. App. 481,
166 N.E.2d 132 (1960), and Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Howard, 286 S.W.2d 302
(Tex. Civ. App. 1956), in support of the proposition that "the refusal of the compensa-
tion policy by the potential assured prevents a contract from ever existing." 69 Wis.
2d at 751, 233 N.W.2d at 389.
20. The Connecticut court in Piscitello cited Connecticut statutory authority for
its holding that the insured employee is given by statute a direct right of recovery from
the insurer. The primary emphasis of the Connecticut court's analysis, however, was
directed towards the estoppel theory of coverage:
As regards employees, the insurer is estopped to deny the truth of the formal
record so made by it, whether or not the particular employee whose rights are
in question examined the file where such records are kept. . . . Whether or not,
therefore, the policy in question was in fact accepted so as to be binding upon
the insured is of no consequence as regards this claimant.
113 Conn. at -, 154 A. at 170.
21. Id. at 752, 233 N.W.2d at 390, citing Kamikawa v. Keshkinen, 44 Wis. 2d 705,
711, 172 N.W.2d 24, 27 (1969).
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'distinctive' feature of compensation insurance. '2 Left unre-
solved is the question of the extent of the insurer's obligations
to the employer when the employee attains the independent
insured status since the absence of a contract will certainly
make this question more difficult.
III. FIRE INSURANCE
The issue resolved by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Gimbels Midwest, Inc. v. Northwestern National Insurance
Co.23 was whether a compromise agreement fixing the amount
of a fire loss at less than the fire policy's face value is of binding
effect in a situation where the valued policy law24 applies. The
court held that such an agreement was not binding.
Subsequent to a fire resulting in damage to a building
owned by the plaintiff, a settlement was entered into between
plaintiffs assignor (who was the insured under the fire policy)
and the defendant insurer for $14,206.47, a sum representing
the actual fire loss. The policy had a face value of $55,000.
Following this settlement, the interest in the fire policy was
assigned to the plaintiff. After some discussions between the
plaintiff and the department of building inspection, a raze
order was issued 5 by the department declaring that the struc-
ture had sustained severe fire damage to the extent that it was
unfit for occupancy and it was unreasonable to repair. Plaintiff
then returned the unnegotiated settlement draft, filed a sup-
plemental proof of loss and demanded the full $55,000 face
value of the policy. The insurer declined to satisfy the $55,000
demand, and suit was brought to resolve the question of the
amount the plainiff was entitled to recover. Upon a finding by
the trial court that the insured was entitled to the full face
value of the policy, the defendant insurer appealed.
In affirming the trial court's holding that the agreement was
binding, the supreme court relied on its recent holding in
Gambrell v. Campbellsport Mutual Insurance Co.26 that
"when, as a result of an insured loss, the owner is precluded
22. 69 Wis. 2d at 750, 233 N.W.2d at 389.
23. 72 Wis. 2d 84, 240 N.W.2d 140 (1976).
24. Wis. STAT. § 203.21 (1973). The valued policy law has been repealed by 1975
Wis. Laws, ch. 375 (effective June 22, 1976).
25. MILWAUKEE, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 14-4 (1941) authorizes the municipal-
ity to order the condemnation of buildings constituting a menace to public safety.
26. 47 Wis. 2d 483, 177 N.W.2d 313 (1970).
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from rebuilding and is required by the municipality to destroy
the insured building, a constructive total loss results and the
valued policy law applies to require the insurer to pay the full
face value of the policy."
The valued policy law, section 203.21 of the Wisconsin Stat-
utes, provides, "Whenever any policy insures real property and
the property is wholly destroyed, without criminal fault on the
part of the insured or his assigns, the amount of the policy shall
be taken conclusively to be the value of the property when
insured and the amount of loss when destroyed." The court
drew from Gambrell the proposition that the valued policy law
is to be considered a part of the insurance contract and further
noted that a settlement for less than face value of the policy
where a total loss occurs is "invalid as unsupported by ade-
quate consideration. '"2 On this authority, the court held that
"an attempted settlement for less than the face value where
there has been a total loss, constructive or otherwise, is void ab
initio as contrary to public policy. '29
The result reached by the Wisconsin court in Gimbels
seems equitable since the insured is provided with no greater
benefit than was bargained for, indemnity for loss, while the
insurer bears no greater burden than the risk it has undertaken.
IV. COVERAGE CLAUSES AND EXCLUSIONS
In Davison v. Wilson,'3 1 the court found invalid as against
public policy' an automobile liability insurance policy provi-
sion which purported to exclude liability coverage for any em-
ployee, including the named insured, for injury sustained by a
coemployee arising out of the maintenance or use of an automo-
bile during the course of employment. 2 The effect of the policy
provision was to exclude coverage for a third-party liability suit
27. Id. at 91. See generally S. KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY (1960); Alex-
ander, Insurance: The Wisconsin "Valued Policy" Law, 10 Wis. L. REV. 248 (1934-35).
28. 72 Wis. 2d at 92, 240 N.W.2d 145.
29. Id.
30. 71 Wis. 2d 630, 239 N.W.2d 38 (1976).
31. In addition to the invalidation on public policy grounds, the court based its
decision on the trial court's finding that the policy failed to comply with Wis. STAT. §
204.34(5) (1973) which requires any policy exclusion of coverage for injuries to automo-
bile passengers to be stated prominently on the face of the policy in contrasting color.
32. The policy provided coverage as follows: "To pay on behalf of the insured all
sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
coverage A, bodily injury, sickness or disease."
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brought under Wisconsin Statutes section 102.29(1) against its
insured, and also to deny its insured benefits if the insured were
injured while riding as a passenger in his own car when driven
by a coemployee during the course of employment.
Davison sustained injuries in an accident while a passenger
in an automobile operated by Wilson. At the time of the acci-
dent, both were employees of the State of Wisconsin and were
using the vehicle in the course of their employment. On the
basis of the above-mentioned exclusion, Wilson's automobile
liability insurer denied coverage. At a trial limited to the cover-
age question the court found for the insured and the insurer
appealed.
On appeal, the supreme court noted that the invalidated
exclusion was located among other policy exclusions which
denied coverage where the named insured was an employer.
The court on previous occasions has found such exclusions in
automobile liability policies valid since the employer is clothed
with an immunity under the Worker's Compensation Act from
tort suits, the benefits of the Act itself being the injured em-
ployee's exclusive remedy against the employer.13 However, the
policy exclusion under consideration limited coverage for em-
ployees rather than employers.
The employee, unlike the employer, does not enjoy the pro-
tection of immunity from tort suits since an injured employee
is permitted to sue a coemployee tortfeasor whose negligence
causes the injuries sustained. 4 Since the policy sought to ex-
clude coverage for injuries sustained by coemployees, the
named insured in Davison would be left personally liable in a
third-party action under section 102.29(1) and the injured
coemployee plaintiff would be denied the benefit of an insured
defendant. This state of affairs, reasoned the court, resulted in
"a windfall" to the insurer "at the expense of the injured em-
ployee and its own insured."3
The court further reasoned that the purported justification
for the exclusion, an actuarial reduction in premiums because
of a lessened risk, did not outweigh the resultant denial of
coverage to the injured employee and named insured.
The court also found public policy objections on two other
33. See Hunker v. Royal Indem. Co., 57 Wis. 2d 588, 204 N.W.2d 897 (1973).
34. Wis. STAT. § 102.29(1) (1973).
35. 71 Wis. 2d at 637, 239 N.W.2d at 42.
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grounds. First, the policy exclusion had the effect of discourag-
ing car pools, with the consequent effect of increasing traffic,
thereby increasing the risk exposure of automobile liability in-
surers. Secondly, the policy provision contravened the public
policy expressed in Wisconsin Statutes section 204.34(4) which
mandates coverage for the named insured under his own con-
tract of insurance when he sustains bodily injuries, since, in a
sense, the named insured is denied the benefits of his own
policy by the denial of coverage to a coemployee who might
operate the named insured's vehicle.
In Lawyer v. Boling," the Wisconsin Supreme Court en-
countered the difficult task of determining whether coverage
exists under an underlying fact situation to which both a policy
exclusion and coverage provision apply. The court held that
exclusionary clauses are to be construed strictly in such a case
and coverage clauses are to be construed broadly so as to afford
greatest protection to the insured.
Lawver, while on an unannounced visit to the farm of his
father-in-law, the defendant Boling, agreed to help repair the
side of a barn. Whether or not Lawver was to be compensated
for his work was not discussed at this time. A chair elevation
rig was improvised from materials supplied by Boling so that
Lawver could be raised along the side of the barn. A rope was
connected to the rig, inserted through a pulley at the top of the
barn and secured to the rear of a pickup truck in order to raise
and lower the rig. Lawver sustained injuries in a fall from the
rig when the rope snapped as Boling moved the truck forward
to raise the rig. It was not until sometime after the accident
that Lawver and Boling discussed for the first time the possibil-
ity that Lawver might be compensated for the work performed,
but nothing was concluded in that regard. Lawver brought suit
against Boling, Boling's automobile liability insurer and
Bolling's farmowner's comprehensive liability insurer.
The automobile insurance policy provided coverage for
"damages because of bodily injury or property damage, arising
out of the ownership, maintenance or use" of an automobile,
but excluded coverage for "bodily injury to any employee of the
insured arising out of and in the course of employment by the
insured." The trial court denied the automobile insurer's mo-
36. 71 Wis. 2d 408, 238 N.W.2d 514 (1976).
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tion for summary judgment which had been based on the em-
ployment injury exclusion and the evidence regarding Lawver's
discussion with Boling of compensation for the work per-
formed.
Boling's farmowner's policy provided bodily injury damages
coverage but excluded coverage for "the ownership, mainte-
nance, operation, use, loading or unloading of . . . automo-
biles." The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment
made by the farmowner insurer, having found that the accident
arose out of the use of a truck within the meaning of the policy
exclusion.
On appeal the supreme court affirmed the trial court's de-
nial of summary judgment for the automobile insurer, holding
that a question of fact existed as to whether or not Lawver was
an employee of Boling so as to be excluded from coverage under
the automobile policy. The automobile insurer raised a second
argument, however, contending that the plaintiff's injuries
were attributable to negligence in constructing the chair rig
and, therefore, could not be said to be injuries "arising out of"
the use of an automobile. Dismissing this argument, the court
explained that "the phrase 'arising out of is not so much con-
cerned with causation as it is with defining the risk for which
coverage will be afforded. 37 The court went on to state that the
coverage question is to be resolved by determining whether the
"use" involved was "reasonably consistent with the inherent
nature of the vehicle." 3 Holding that the use of the truck under
the facts in Lawyer was reasonably consistent with the use of
a farm vehicle, the court found no abuse of discretion by the
trial court in denying the automobile insurer's motion for sum-
mary judgment.
Of greater significance was the court's discussion consider-
ing the trial court's granting of summary judgment to the
farmowner's insurance carrier. The trial court was of the
opinion that a determination that the injuries arose out of the
use of a truck so as to result in coverage under the automobile
policy precluded a finding of coverage under the farmowner's
policy because of the exclusion for automobile use. The court
on appeal conceded that prior Wisconsin cases tended to sup-
37. Id. at 415-16, 238 N.W.2d at 518.
38. Id. at 416, 238 N.W.2d at 518, citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exchange,
63 Wis. 2d 148, 216 N.W.2d 205 (1974).
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port the trial court's conclusion. 9
In one such decision, Village of Luck v. Hardware Mutual
Casualty Co.,4" the court sustained a trial court summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant-insurer in an action brought by
its insured, a municipality, for the defense costs and judgment
paid in a wrongful death action. The insured claimed it was
entitled to coverage since one of the allegations in the death
action complaint was based on conduct covered by one of the
policy provisions. The complaint in the wrongful death action
alleged two counts of negligence on the part of the municipal-
ity: one based on negligent operation of a municipal truck by
street construction workers, and the other based on the munici-
pality's negligence in failing to provide barriers, signs, and sig-
nals for pedestrian safety. The court found no liability under
the policy on the basis of a motor-vehicle use exclusion even
though the second alleged basis for negligence was a covered
risk under the policy.
Along the same lines, the court in Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Truck Insurance Exchange" held that a homeowner's insurer
could not be liable under a policy containing an exclusion for
loss arising out of the loading or unloading of a vehicle-even
though the court acknowledged that the loss was also a result
of conduct which was covered by the homeowner's policy.
Thus, in both earlier Wisconsin cases, the court had found
that insurance policy exclusions apply so as to discharge the
insurer from liability even where evidence was present indicat-
ing a concurrent cause of loss which fell within the coverage of
the policy.
Apparently overruling its prior holdings, the court relied on
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Partridge,4"
decided by the California Supreme Court, which held that
"when two . . . risks constitute concurrent proximate causes
of an accident, the insurer is liable so long as one of the causes
is covered by the policy."4 Realizing that its decision resulted
in a strict construction of the exclusion in the farmowner's
policy, the court was nevertheless persuaded by the rationale
39. 71 Wis. 2d at 417, 238 N.W.2d at 519.
40. 268 Wis. 223, 67 N.W.2d 306 (1954).
41. 63 Wis. 2d 148, 216 N.W.2d 205 (1974).
42. 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1973).
43. Id. at 102, 514 P.2d at 129, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
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for the California rule since "the insurer, under such circum-
stances, is not being held to provide coverage for a risk which
it did not contemplate and for which it received no premium.
Indeed, it would appear to be unfair to the insured to deny
benefits he has paid for.""
Based on its determination to apply the California rule to
the facts in Lawyer, the court reversed the trial court's order
for summary judgment in favor of the farmowner's insurer,
remanding the case for trial with both insurers remaining as
defendants.
Although the holding of Lawyer was specifically within the
context of the propriety of the summary judgment granted by
the trial court, the court's conclusion appears to have wider
ramifications: "We conclude [the farmowner's insurer] should
not be excused from its obligation to defend the action or pay
benefits until it has been determined that the injuries did not
result, even in part, from a risk for which it provided coverage
and collected a premium."4 As a practical matter, this holding
results in an obligation on the insurer's part to defend all ac-
tions in which injuries are alleged to have been sustained by a
covered risk although an excluded risk is also alleged to have
been a source of the injury. This conclusion follows from the
fact that the determination referred to in the above-quoted
language is a question of fact which in almost all cases must
go to the jury.
Of even greater significance, however, is the fact that the
court's holding will require insurers to pay benefits whenever
the injuries involved arise, to any extent, out of a covered risk,
notwithstanding the existence of an express exclusion from lia-
bility applicable to the facts.
In a 1964 case, Foryan v. Firemen's Fund Insurance Co.,"
the Wisconsin court raised the issue of whether the concept of
permission as used in coverage clauses required by the omnibus
statute" differs from the concept of permission found in the
44. 71 Wis. 2d at 422, 238 N.W.2d at 521.
45. Id., 238 N.W.2d at 522.
46. 27 Wis. 2d 133, 133 N.W.2d 724 (1964).
47. Wis. STAT. § 204.30(3) (1973) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
No . . . policy [of automobile liability insurance] shall be issued or delivered
in this state to the owner of a motor vehicle, unless it contains a provision
substantially as follows: . . . The insurance hereby afforded shall not apply
unless the riding, use or operation is with the permission of the assured named
in this policy . ...
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extended coverage provision under Wisconsin Statutes section
344.33(2) of the financial responsibility chapter.48 The specific
question raised was whether implied permissive automobile
use was to be viewed from the point of view of the driver or the
owner. 9 The court declined to answer the question since the
issue had not been raised on appeal.
The court finally faced the question again this term in Gross
v. Joecks ° In both Foryan and Gross, coverage for drivers of
non-owned automobiles was in issue, the factual question being
whether or not permission to drive had been extended by the
car owners.
The policy in Gross afforded coverage to the insured for
liability arising out of the use of any unowned automobile while
being operated by the insured "with the permission of the
owner and .. .within the scope of such permission." This
provision was modelled after the "any motor vehicle" coverage
of section 344.33(2).
The omnibus statute, section 204.30 of the Wisconsin Stat-
utes, also limits coverage to permissive use of the insured vehi-
cle, but differs in that omnibus coverage "follows the vehicle
insured" when driven by any permitted driver, whereas the
financial responsibility law extended coverage "follows the
driver insured"5' in any vehicle driven with permission. A fur-
ther difference between the two types of coverage is that the
omnibus coverage must be included in any policy issued or
delivered within Wisconsin whereas the "any motor vehicle"
coverage must be included in a policy only where the insured
is required to file proof of financial responsibility as a condition
to the reissuance of a previously revoked automobile operator
license.
The court held that in spite of these differences "the con-
cept of permissive use is to be viewed the same regardless of
whether the question arises under the 'any motor vehicle' cov-
erage of sec. 344.33(2), Stats., or the omnibus coverage under
sec. 204.30(3) ."52 The "key factor" in the court's view was that
48. The permissive use concept in Wis. STAT. § 344.33(2) (1973) appears as follows:
"A motor vehicle policy of liability insurance shall insure the person named therein
using any motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of the owner .... .
49. 27 Wis. 2d at 142, 133 N.W.2d at 729.
50. 72 Wis. 2d 583, 241 N.W.2d 727 (1976).
51. 27 Wis. 2d at 141, 133 N.W.2d at 729 (emphasis added).
52. 72 Wis. 2d at 589, 241 N.W.2d at 730.
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"both [policy provisions] are required by statute"53 even
though the "any motor vehicle" coverage is so required only
when financial responsibility must be proven.54 Furtner, the
court found that both policy provisions served a common pur-
pose, protection of the public.
The result of Gross is that the cases which have liberally
construed the concept of permission in favor of coverage under
the omnibus statute apply with equal force to the "any motor
vehicle" coverage of section 344.33(2). 55
V. UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
In Seigel v. American Interstate Insurance Corp. ," the Wis-
consin court invalidated an attempt by an automobile liability
insurer to limit its uninsured motorist coverage for bodily in-
jury to five specific scheduled payments: medical expenses,
loss of earnings, disability and death benefits and funeral ex-
penses.
The court reversed a trial court finding that the provisions
of the insurance policy in question" complied with the require-
53. Id.
54. The insured in Gross was not required to file proof of financial responsibility
but the provision nevertheless appeared in the policy. While the court acknowledged
this fact, it nevertheless found as the "lay factor" that such coverage was required by
statute.
55. See Upton v. Tatro, 68 Wis. 2d 562, 229 N.W.2d 691 (1975); Nordahl v. Peter-
son, 68 Wis. 2d. 538, 229 N.W.2d 682 (1975).
56. 72 Wis. 2d 522, 241 N.W.2d 178 (1976).
57. Coverage I-Family Protection Against Uninsured Motorists (Bodily In-
jury Liability): .. .
Insuring Agreements-Coverage 1
1. Bodily Injury by Uninsured Driver. To pay all sums as provided in the
following schedule which the insured or his legal representatives shall be legally
entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured
automobile because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death result-
ing therefrom, hereinafter called 'bodily injury,' sustained by the insured,
caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such
uninsured automobile; provided, for the purposes of this coverage, determina-
tion as to whether the insured or such representative is legally entitled to recover
such damages, and if so, the amount of recovery under the following schedules,
shall be made by agreement between the insured or such representative and the
company, or, if they fail to agree, by normal recourse to the court having juris-
diction. Payments under the following Schedule are subject to the maximums
stated under paragraph 4, Limits of Liability of the Conditions of this Coverage.
Schedule:
(1) Medical expense. All reasonable expenses incurred from the date of the
accident by such insured or legal representatives, for necessary medical, surgical
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ments of Wisconsin Statutes section 204.30(5)(a). That statute
requires that automobile liability insurers provide coverage for
"bodily injury or death . . . for the protection of persons in-
jured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because
of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting
therefrom."
The court acknowledged that the statute failed to enumer-
ate what types of damage were contemplated by the term "bod-
ily injury." However, the court cited authority which listed
several types of damages generally recognized as recoverable
for bodily injury which were not included within the bodily
injury coverage of the defendant's policy.5" Most notably ab-
sent from the items of "bodily injury" damage enumerated in
the defendant's policy were damages for pain and suffering,
which are said to be "the primary legal element of damage
")59resulting from injury ....
Finding no legislative intent to limit coverage for "bodily
injury" damages, the court held that the use of the term "bod-
ily injury" in the statute "[pointed] to the conclusion that the
insured is entitled to recover for those elements of damage for
which a comprehensive definition of the term 'bodily injury'
would allow.""0
and dental services, including prosthetic devices, and necessary ambulance,
hospital and professional nursing to or for each insured who sustains bodily
injury caused by accident.
(2) Loss of earnings. The actual loss of earnings suffered by the insured if
as a result of such accident he becomes wholly unable to engage in his usual
occupation or employment, and while such total disability continues during his
lifetime. Such actual loss of earnings shall be computed upon the basis of the
insured's average monthly earnings during the one year immediately preceding
such accident.
(3) Disability. Ten dollars per day to each insured who is the head of a
household or to each insured who is the spouse of the head of a household at
the time of such accident, and five dollars per day to any other insured, while
such insured is totally disabled as a result of bodily injury sustained in such
accident requiring continuous confinement indoors, under the care of a licensed
doctor of medicine other than himself.
(4) Death benefits and funeral expenses. The maximum benefit under this
section shall be $15,000 for the death of any one person as a result of said
accident and $30,000 if such accident results in the death of more than one
person. The amount recoverable within these limits shall be governed by the
applicable Wrongful Death and/or Survival Statutes.
58. A. WIDiss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE § 2.50 (1969).
59. 72 Wis. 2d at 529, 241 N.W.2d at 182, citing 9 D. BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW
AND PRAcrICE §§ 387.3-.7 (1965).
60. 70 Wis. 2d at 530, 241 N.W.2d at 182.
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Hence, the Wisconsin court in Seigel has effectively prohib-
ited any policy provision restricting the types of damages for
which persons injured by the negligence of uninsured motorists
may seek recovery.
In Drake v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co.,6' the court
held that where a person sustains injuries in an automobile
accident due to the joint negligence of two parties, only one of
which is solvent, and elects to commence a negligence action
against the solvent driver rather than first suing his own auto-
mobile liability insurer for uninsured motorist benefits, the
negligence action must be resolved before any action can be
brought under the uninsured motorist coverage. The plaintiff
sustained injuries in an automobile accident in which her unin-
sured host collided with another vehicle whose driver was in-
sured under a policy having limits of $50,000. The plaintiff
commenced an action in 1974 against the estate of the unin-
sured motorist, the driver of the second vehicle, and the second
driver's insurer, alleging that the two drivers were joint tortfea-
sors. On two occasions prior to the commencement of the negli-
gence action the plaintiff made a claim against her own insurer
under the uninsured motorists provision of the policy, 2 but the
insurer had denied coverage apparently because the insured
driver's policy would afford sufficient coverage to satisfy the
plaintiff's claim.
61. 70 Wis. 2d 977, 236 N.W.2d 204 (1975).
62. The uninsured motorist coverage provided by the defendant insurer was as
follows:
To pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be legally
entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured
automobile because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death result-
ing therefrom, hereinafter called "bodily injury," sustained by the insured,
caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such
uninsured automobile; provided for the purposes of this coverage, determination
as to whether the insured or such representative is legally entitled to recover
such damages, and if so the amount thereof, shall be made by agreement be-
tween the insured or such representative and the company or, if they fail to
agree, by arbitration.
The standard reduction clause, now prohibited by Wis. STAT. § 204.30(5) (a) (1973) was
also present:
(b) Any amount payable under the terms of this Part because of bodily
injury sustained in an accident by a person who is an insured under this Part
shall be reduced by:
(1) all sums paid on account of such bodily injury by or on behalf of (i) the
owner or operator of the uninsured automobile and (ii) any other person or
organization jointly or severally liable together with such owner or operator for
such bodily injury. . ..
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The plaintiff later commenced a second suit against her
own insurer alleging that it had breached its obligation to pay
the uninsured motorist coverage policy limits of $15,000. She
also sought damages for emotional distress and punitive dam-
ages. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint
finding that it failed to state a cause of action.
On appeal, the court addressed the issue of whether an
action against an insurer by its insured under the uninsured
motorist coverage was demurrable where the insured had pre-
viously commenced an action against the allegedly negligent
parties, including the uninsured motorist.13 Plaintiff relied
upon the recent case of Collicott v. Economy Fire & Casualty
Co., 4 where the holding was summarized by the Drake court
as follows: "[A]n insured may sue his insurance company
under the uninsured motorist coverage, even if there are other
insured parties involved in the accident who are potentially
liable but have not yet been sued."65 Collicott controlled, the
plaintiff argued, because her uninsured motorist claims were
made prior to the commencement of the negligence action.
The court found, however, that the election by plaintiff to
sue the uninsured motorist's estate, the insured driver and his
insurer rendered Collicott inapplicable. Instead, the court re-
lied on another line of cases" which established the policy that
uninsured motorist coverage was merely a "backstop or last
resort protection. 61 7 Based on this authority, the court rea-
soned:
It makes no sense to let Drake sue [the uninsured motor-
ists's] estate, the other driver, and her insurance company,
and proceed to sue her own insurance company in a subse-
quent suit, when a judgment or settlement in the first suit
may well preclude any recovery at all in the second suit (as
it will in this case) and may also resolve the main question
at issue in the second suit (whether Drake is legally entitled
to recover from [the uninsured motorist's] estate for her
63. The negligence action was settled during the pendency of the appeal in the
action against the insurer. 70 Wis. 2d at 981, 236 N.W.2d at 207.
64. 68 Wis. 2d 115, 227 N.W.2d 668 (1975).
65. 70 Wis. 2d at 982, 236 N.W.2d at 207.
66. Nelson v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 63 Wis. 2d 558, 217 N.W.2d 670 (1974);
Scherr v. Drobac, 53 Wis. 2d 308, 193 N.W.2d 14 (1972); Leatherman v. American
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 52 Wis. 2d 644, 190 N.W.2d 904 (1971).
67. Leatherman v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 52 Wis. 2d 644, 651, 190
N.W.2d 904, 907 (1971).
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injuries). To hold otherwise would be to approve a second suit
which may ultimately prove to be completely fruitless or at
least redundant in important respects."
The effect of Drake is to clarify two options open to a plain-
tiff injured by the negligence of an uninsured motorist:
(1) Based on Collicott, an immediate suit may be brought
against his own insurer under the uninsured motorist coverage
even if other potentially liable sources are available for suit; or
(2) An action may be commenced against the uninsured mo-
torist and other potentially liable parties and proceed to
judgment, after which it can be determined whether a recovery
has been yielded in excess of the uninsured motorist policy





A. Right to Discrimination Hearing
In Watkins v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human
Relations,' the supreme court held that the Fair Employment
Act2 requires the Department of Industry, Labor and Human
Relations (DILHR) to make a discrimination determination if
demanded by the complainant even though the employer or
union has rectified the alleged discrimination after the filing of
the complaint. No determination, however, is required if the
parties later enter into a bilateral conciliation agreement.
The complainant in Watkins was a black woman employed
by the Milwaukee County social services department. She al-
leged in her complaint that the employer had discriminated
against her because of her race in refusing her a requested job
transfer. Before the department made its initial determination
as required by Wisconsin Statutes section 111.36(3) (a),3 she
68. 70 Wis. 2d at 982-83, 236 N.W.2d at 207.
1. 69 Wis. 2d 782, 233 N.W.2d 360 (1975).
2. Wis. STAT. § 111.31 et seq. (1973).
3. Wis. STAT. § 111.36(3)(a) (1973).
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